Bloody Benefactors – Transregional Terrorist Group Sponsorship in Civil Wars

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Bloody Benefactors – Transregional Terrorist Group Sponsorship in Civil Wars

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Bloody Benefactors

Transregional Terrorist Group Sponsorship in Civil Wars

Laila A. Wahedi / law98@georgetown.edu

al Qaeda's Network

Transregional Groups:

Operate in more than one contiguous region

✔ AQIM: Algeria, and Mali.

✘PKK: Kurdistan, transnational not transregional

✘PFLP: Palestine/Lebanon, international allies, no presence

Asset Specificity

Local Groups

  • Local Infrastructure
    • Sons of the Soil
    • Local Networks
    • Territorial Access

Transregional Groups

  • Global Infrastructure
    • Donor Networks
    • Training/Intel
    • Legitimacy

Why do some groups form partnerships, but not others?

Why do groups partner when they do?

Who do transregional groups want to sponsor?

Strong Groups

Who wants sponsorship?

Weak Groups

When can sponsorship occur?

Roadmap

  • Who Transregional Groups Want:
  • Who Wants Transregional Groups?
  • Resolving the Tension
  • Empirical Strategy
  • Afghan Civil War

Who Transregional Groups Want:

Ideologues

✘

Weak Groups

✘

Strong Groups

✔

Ideology ✘

  • Groups partner with ideologically similar groups
Not enough to explain variation:
  • Outbidding: (Kydd & Walter 2013)--Hezbollah & Amal, Nusra & ISIS
  • Timing: AQIM & al Qaeda, al Shabaab & al Qaeda
  • Failure to partner: al Qaeda in Palestine, Chechnya

Weak Groups ✘

  • Prefer weak groups they can control:
    • Asymmetric ties solve commitment problems (Bapat & Bond 2013)
    • Strong partners are hard to influence (Shapiro 2007, Morrow 1991)
    • Local affiliates prioritize local goals (Byman 2014, Thomas 2013)

Weak vs. Strong Groups

Group Strength

  • Asset Specificity:
  • Capacity to survive/operate:
  • Command & Control:

Weak ✘

✘

✘

Expensive

Strong ✔

Secure territory

✔

✔

Roadmap

  • Who Transregional Groups Want
  • Who Wants Transregional Groups?
  • Resolving the Tension
  • Empirical Strategy
  • Afghan Civil War

Which Local Groups Want Sponsorship?

Group Strength

Asset Specificity:

Prioritize:

Independence:

Strong ✘

Have resources to survive/operate

Sovereignty

Secure, autonomous

Weak ✔

Need resources to survive/operate

Survival

Insecure, need guidance

Roadmap

  • Who Transregional Groups Want
  • Who Wants Transregional Groups?
  • Resolving the Tension
  • Empirical Strategy
  • Afghan Civil War

Tension

Transregional groups want strong partners

but

Only weak local groups want sponsors

Tension

Transregional Groups

  • Want
    • Territory
    • Capacity
  • Offer
    • Donor networks
    • Intel/Training
    • Legitimacy

Local Groups

  • Want
    • Sovereignty
    • Autonomy
    • Resources/Legitimacy*
  • Offer
    • Local infrastructure
    • Territory

*From local or external sources

When are their needs compatible?

Strong Local Groups:

  • Partner with:
  • Secure Territory
  • High Capacity

Local Group Needs Assets:

  • Group in Decline
  • Local Rivals
  • Counter-Insurgency

Boost Local Autonomy

  • Reduce dependence on local partners

Hypotheses

  • H1: Transregional groups prefer strong partners with secure territory, over weak groups they can control.
  • H2: Local groups prefer sources of resources that do not impinge on their sovereignty.
  • H3: Local groups will accept sponsorship only if the goods transregional groups can provide are of greater value than the sovereignty and autonomy costs.

Roadmap

  • Who Transregional Groups Want
  • Who Wants Transregional Groups?
  • Resolving the Tension
  • Empirical Strategy
  • Afghan Civil War

Empirical Strategy

  • Comparative Case Studies:
    • Control for ideology
  • Challenge: Identifying Failed Alliances
    • Identify likely partnerships from rhetoric
    • Temporal variation
    • Within-War Variation

Comparative Case Studies

Successful Partnerships

Resource Access

  • AQIM 2007
  • Al Shabaab 2012
  • Taliban*

Reduced Leverage

  • Hezb-e-Islami

Unsuccessful Partnerships

Preferred Sovereignty

  • GSPC/GIA pre-2007
  • Jamiat-e-Islami
  • Chechen Republic of Ichkeria/Caucuses Emirate*
  • Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood

Weak Groups

  • AIAI/Islamic Courts Union/ al Shabaab pre-2007
  • Jund Ansar Allah

Empirical Strategy

  • Evidence
    • Harmony Documents and other captured documents
    • Recorded Interviews
    • Secondary Sources
    • Insights from field work in Afghanistan

Empirical Strategy

Evidence

Transregional groups choose:

Local groups:

Ideology:

In favor

Groups offering secure territory

Prefer resources with lower autonomy costs

Not Enough

Against

Weak partners to control

Always want sponsors/resources

Overcomes material concerns

Roadmap

  • Who Transregional Groups Want
  • Who Wants Transregional Groups?
  • Resolving the Tension
  • Empirical Strategy
  • Afghan Civil War

Afghanistan, 1985

CIA map, library of congress permalink: https://lccn.loc.gov/85697410

Takeaways So Far

  • Many Islamist groups
  • Debate over support for strongest two
  • Debate over transregional nature of Jihadist Movement

Local Groups

Hekmatyar's Hezb-e-Islami

  • Big Stick Legitimacy
  • Competing sub-commanders
  • Territory on border

Massoud's Jamiat-i-Islami

  • Charismatic Legitimacy
  • Mineral Wealth
  • Western Hands-off Support

Jalaluddin Haqqani

  • Security from Hezb-e-Islami
  • Rivals within Hezb-e-Islami
  • Dependent on Hekmatyar

Offers Territory for Network

Summary

  • There were many ideologically similar groups to choose between
  • Services Organization only considered strong groups
  • Group with more alternatives did not solicit support as strongly
  • Sub-commander of group soliciting support traded territory for increased relative autonomy

Conclusions

  • Exploitable tensions in ideological partnerships
  • Broader Research Agenda

Broader Implications

Laila A. Wahedi · law98@georgetown.edu Follow along at wahedi.org
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Bloody Benefactors Transregional Terrorist Group Sponsorship in Civil Wars Laila A. Wahedi / law98@georgetown.edu